Højreekstremisme i Norge - forandringer og udfordringer

Som forsker, Jeg har fulgt forskellige højreekstremistiske grupper og bevægelser i Norge og Skandinavien gennem de sidste 30 år. Der har været nogle væsentlige ændringer i løbet af denne tid – ændringer, der har indflydelse på, hvordan vores samfund skal forholde sig til sådanne miljøer, og hvilke former for forebyggende foranstaltninger, der kan være relevante og effektive.

Først, hvad mener vi med begreber som højreekstremisme? I forskning om den såkaldte yderste højrefløj, det er almindeligt accepteret blandt forskere at skelne mellem det radikale højre og det ekstreme højre. De deler en form for nativisme eller etnisk nationalisme samt intolerance over for forskellighed. Imidlertid, højreradikale aktører opererer inden for demokratiske grænser, der henviser til, at ekstreme højreaktører åbent afviser demokrati og universelle menneskerettigheder, og anser vold mod "folkets fjender" for at være legitim.

Racistiske ungdomskulturer er væk

En af de mest slående udviklinger i Norge og mange andre lande er, at højreekstremisme ikke længere er et typisk ungdomsproblem længere, men sådanne organisationer og bevægelser udgøres nu næsten udelukkende af voksne. I løbet af 1990'erne og begyndelsen af ​​2000'erne var der nogle ret store ekstreme højre ungdomssubkulturer og grupper i Norge og andre vestlige lande. Disse bevægelser var hovedsageligt forbundet med skinhead-subkulturen (i Norge repræsenteret af grupper som Boot Boys), samt white power musikbands og koncerter, og nynazistiske organisationer, der appellerede til nogle marginaliserede og udsatte unge (f.eks. Vigrid). De fleste deltagere blev rekrutteret til disse scener som teenagere, grupperne selv opfylder nogle grundlæggende sociale behov såsom venskab, identitet, beskyttelse, spænding og gruppetilhørsforhold. Især i skinhead-bevægelsen, vold og had mod modstandere, indvandrere, og andre marginaliserede grupper havde en værdi i sig selv. Deres visuelle stil var let genkendelig på gaden, som ofte førte til voldelige sammenstød med modstandere, såsom venstreorienterede og antifascistiske militante.

Der er næppe nogen sådanne ekstreme højre- eller racistiske ungdomsscener tilbage i Norge i dag. Der er ingen attraktive sociale arenaer, der kan trække unge ind i ekstrem-højre eller racistiske bevægelser, og der er heller ikke en White Power-musikscene, som der var i 1990'erne. Den vigtigste nynazistiske organisation, den nordiske modstandsbevægelse, har omkring 30-40 aktivister i Norge, måske 4-500 i Sverige, og omkring 100 i Finland og Danmark. Imidlertid, medlemmerne af denne organisation er voksne, typisk mellem 20 og 50 år, og i hvert fald i Norge, der er næppe nogen teenagere. Tilsyneladende, gruppens meget stramme regler og levevis ser ikke ud til at appellere til mange unge. Den nationalsocialistiske ideologi fremstår forældet.

Vigilante-grupper som Soldiers of Odin var hovedsageligt et fællesskab af nogle unge mænd og nogle få kvinder mellem 20 og 40, snarere end en gruppe, der appellerer til teenagere. Generationsidentitet, en etno-nationalistisk bevægelse, der har haft held med at rekruttere studerende og andre ressourcestærke unge i nogle europæiske lande, har endnu ikke kunnet få noget nævneværdigt fodfæste i Norge. Imidlertid, det er formentlig den slags yderste højrebevægelse, der kan have potentiale til at rekruttere blandt norske unge.

Radikale højreorganisationer mod immigration og islamisering, som Stop islamisering af Norge/Danmark/Europa, Pegida og den engelske/norske forsvarsliga, Folkebevægelsen mod Immigration (FMI) og et parti kaldet "Demokraterne", består typisk af voksne og ældre, men der er næppe nogen unge at se i disse organisationer.

En hovedårsag til dette skift væk fra højreekstremisme blandt unge er, at frygten for udlændinge – fremmedhad – gradvist er blevet reduceret blandt de yngre generationer i Norge. Flere holdningsundersøgelser har vist, at fremmedhad hovedsageligt bevares blandt de ældre generationer. Unge i dag vokser op i et multikulturelt samfund, og de er vant til skolekammerater og venner fra forskellige kulturelle, religiøse og racemæssige baggrunde. Det er ikke det samme med ældre mennesker, som er meget mere bekymrede over "fremmede" ansigter og kulturer.

Denne ændring har store konsekvenser for, hvordan man forebygger højreekstremisme, og hvilke agenturer, der besidder de relevante ressourcer og foranstaltninger til at gøre det. Da målgruppen for forebyggelse tilbage i 1990'erne og begyndelsen af ​​2000'erne hovedsageligt var teenagere, der var et stort forebyggelsesapparat i kommunerne med fokus på børn og unge:Skolevæsenet, for eksempel, har lærere til opgave at følge op på elever med forskellige problemer og elever, der gik ud af skolen. Der var skolesygeplejersker, ungdomsarbejdere, psykosociale teams for unge, børnebeskyttelsestjenester, ungdomsklubber, sportsklubber og andre fritidsaktiviteter. Der var også et tæt samarbejde mellem forebyggende politi, skoler og sociale tjenester til at følge op unge i risikogruppen eller involveret i stoffer, bander, vold eller ekstremisme. Alle disse ydelser og forebyggende tiltag – kerneelementer i den skandinaviske velfærdsstat – er irrelevante, når målgruppen ikke længere er teenagere, men unge voksne eller ældre fra 18 til 80. Nye tilgange er nødvendige, og andre aktører og instanser skal involveres. Kriminalforsorgen (fængselsvæsenet), arbejdsformidlingen og forskellige sundhedstjenester er vigtige aktører i håndteringen af ​​disse voksne militante, selvom politiet og sikkerhedstjenesten vil spille en stor rolle i at forhindre disse voksne aktivister i at begå kriminalitet, and follow them up with more repressive measures if they do.

From street activism to internet activism – and back to the street?

Another significant change during the last decades is that the arenas for extremist activism to a large extent – but not completely – have moved from physical meetings and street activism onto the Internet in the forms of web pages, blogs and various types of social media (such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, etc).

This change has several consequences:the threshold for participating in discussions and exchange of opinions has become lower. It is also much easier to find people sharing your particular views on the Internet than in traditional social arenas. In discussion fora at Facebook or other social media you can get your radical views confirmed and reinforced through interaction with likeminded peers, leading to a radicalisation of your own worldview. The threshold is lower for expressing extremist attitudes or making hateful or threatening statements. The increase in hate speech and threats against politicians that has been measured is several studies during the last few years is mainly reflecting an increase in such statements in social media. Such hate speech and threats may become so stressful and frightening that some top politicians have considered giving up their political positions and public engagement activities.

Another reason for the increase in extreme-right activism on the Internet is that the risk to participate in such activities is much lower in on-line activism than in off-line activities. There is little risk for being physically attacked by militant anti-racists. Ja, more broadly, when extremist activism is mainly taking place in the virtual space there are fewer opportunities for physical and violent clashes with political opponents. The experience from Norway during the 1990s and early 2000s was that such confrontations could have radicalising impact on both sides and cause a spiral of violence. I Norge, this form of violent conflict dynamics has been relatively absent during the last 15 years. Hate crime in the form of violence, harassment and threats does still happen in the physical space but most of this aggression and hatred is now coming out as hate speech and harassment in social media. Because the threshold for making such hateful statements has been lowered, the volume of it has also increased. When my colleague Jacob Aasland Ravndal in his Ph.D. thesis finds that the number of right-wing extremist attacks in Western Europe has been reduced in the period between 1990 and 2015, one of the possible explanations he provides is that a large part of extremist political activism has moved from the physical space to on-line activism.

Imidlertid, street activism has not ended completely, and some far-right and extreme-right groups have even re-invigorated their street-level activity. Some anti-Islam groups have had a number of street stands to propagate their message, although with limited participation. I mange tilfælde, their talks have been drowned out by shouting from counter-demonstrators. There have also been two main attempts to mobilise mass demonstrations against immigration and Islam, but both failed. The English Defence League, which has mobilised thousands in the UK, inspired the Norwegian Defence League, but the turn-out was very low. The same happened with the Norwegian off-shoot of the German Pegida movement, which mobilised tens of thousands in cities like Dresden in Germany. Their Norwegian subsidiary got some attention initially, but it soon petered out.

Imidlertid, the Nordic Resistance Movement has succeeded in organising some rather large street demonstrations, in particular in Sweden, with up to 500 participants marching with flags, uniforms and shields. In Norway they have only managed to mobilise 70 and 50 participants in two demonstrations, and the majority of the demonstrators were Swedish activists, not Norwegians. Imidlertid, what makes the demonstrations of the Norwegian Resistance Movement more powerful and scary than their limited numbers should entail is that they act in a very disciplined way, almost in military order, with banners and uniforms. Previous Norwegian neo-Nazis have never been able to act like that, even if the Norwegian branch of the Nordic Resistance movement could not have done this without a lot of support from their Swedish partners.

The Nordic Resistance Movement claims that violence will be necessary to achieve their revolution but they do not consider it strategically useful to make use of it at this stage. Their rhetoric is very violent, selvom, carrying posters with pictures of politicians and others they claim are "traitors of the people" during their demonstrations, and also putting up posters saying that traitors shall be hanged. Imidlertid, they rarely initiate violent attacks against opponents, although they are ready to attack anyone who provoke them. I Finland, an activist kicked down a person who said something against the group. He died a few days later. The organisation has now been banned by the court in Finland. I Norge, imidlertid, the police cannot ban the Nordic Resistance Movement from staging marches and demonstrations as long as they operate within the boundaries of the law and the freedom of expression. I et tilfælde the police banned their demonstration due to the risk of violent clashes with militant counter-demonstrators. This decision was strongly criticised by legal experts on human rights. Handling demonstrations by national socialists – declared enemies of democracy and human rights – is a dilemma the police will continue to face for the foreseeable future.

One of the consequences of activism transferring from the street to the web and social media is that most of the activism is no longer linked to a geographical location where there is an apparatus for prevention. That means that there is not necessarily any particular agency who feels responsible to intervene against hate speech or individuals who cross the line. Tidligere, the local police knew the individuals who had extremist inclinations. In the present situation, such individuals and incidents might be detected by or reported to central units in the police or security service – or not. These units may – or may not – send the cases to the local police and ask them to intervene. I Norge, the National Criminal Investigation Service has for some years had a so-called Net Patrol, but until now, they have not had the capacity to actively monitor the web and social media. It has mainly functioned as an Internet portal – a virtual police station – where people can report incidents. Beginning in January 2019, the National Criminal Investigation Service has set up a new centre for digital policing, tasked with doing more active patrolling on the net. The police do prosecute a number of cases of hate speech and threats made through social media, and there have been several convictions during the last few years. Many cases are in the grey area of legality, selvom. Imidlertid, the police has developed another measure that has proven to be quite effective:giving warnings and using preventive dialogue to make people change their behaviour, as well as using dialogue to assess whether there is a risk that the offender might actually do something more than making verbal threats.

Globalisation and transnational diffusion

Globalisation is not a new phenomenon when it comes to political extremism in general and right-wing extremism in particular. Militant ideologies and modes of action have spread from country to country and inspired new groups and generations, as evidenced by Italian fascism, German National Socialism, American racism and fascist skinhead culture from England. Imidlertid, previously, this travelling of extremist ideas, social movements and action forms happened rather slowly. It took almost a decade before the racist skinhead style took foothold among groups of youths in Norway, and more than a decade before it faded away.

During the last 10-15 years the diffusion of radical and extremist movements has accelerated amazingly. Concepts, names and action forms like PEGIDA, the English/Norwegian Defence League and the Soldiers of Odin took merely days or weeks from they emerged in Germany or Finland until an off-shoot was planted in Norway. Within a few months in 2016, Soldiers of Odin spread to more than 20 countries. Imidlertid, these off-shoots had a rapid growth before they dried out and disappeared. Tilsyneladende, they did not find a fertile ground and failed to set down roots.

The news media played a major role in the launching of these new, imported groups. When the Norwegian Defence League, Pegida and the Soldiers of Odin staged their first events, there were often more journalists than activists or demonstrators present, giving the upstarts a lot of publicity to start with.

The contrast to these rapid-growing but failed off-shoots was the Norwegian Resistance Movement, which was an off-shoot of the original Swedish Resistance Movement. Both the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian branches have spent years to build a disciplined, hierarchical organisation with a solid stem of activists, WHO, though small in number, are very dedicated.

Islam as the new main enemy

The organised opposition to immigration that emerged during the late 1980s with the establishment of the People's Movement against Immigration and similar organisations were, to begin with, a rather marginal and stigmatized movement. The movement was characterized by an extremist, rude rhetoric which justified violence against their opponents, described as "national traitors". During the last 15 years the general opposition against immigration has moved towards a more specific fight against Islam and immigration by Muslims. This skepticism against Islam is no longer mainly associated with marginal groupings but has now made inroads into the political mainstream. In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks in the USA in 2001 and a series of lethal terrorist attacks in Europe during the following years, militant Islamism and jihadi terrorism now appears as a real threat to ordinary people in Norway as well as to the rest of Europe. I øvrigt, many feel that conservative Islamist customs and dress codes have spread in ways that is challenging liberal Norwegian and European values and norms.

Another significant development is that some of the leading anti-Islam activists have a political background which is not from the far right but rather from the radical or liberal left, from anti-religious secularism and from the feminist movement. In contrast to the traditional anti-immigration movement, which often appeared as reactionary male chauvinists, many opponents of Islam today present themselves as defenders of women's liberation, gender equality and gay rights. For some of the anti-Islam activists, these are genuine liberal values, whereas others who voice these arguments appear more as opportunists in this regard. Imidlertid, within the anti-Islam movements, old-fashioned extreme-right attitudes live side-by-side with liberal and secular values.

The boundaries for what is acceptable to express publicly about Muslims and Islam has moved considerably during the previous 10-15 years. Much of what is said in the public, would not have been acceptable if one said "Jew" rather than "Muslim". Leading Norwegian politicians have made statements about a "sneaky islamisation of Norway" and similar statements that contributes to a normalization of claims that their political opponents have deliberately facilitated an Islamic "invasion" of Europe. A likely consequence of pointing out Islam as the new main enemy is that an increasing share of extreme-right violence and hate crime is now directed specifically against Muslims. I særdeleshed, women wearing hijab or niqab have become victims of hateful harassment and violence. It is laudable that the Norwegian government has recently launched an action plan against anti-Semitism. Imidlertid, there is an even greater need for a preventive strategy against Islamophobia.